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Introduction 
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, increasing positive balances on the 
services account provided a substantial offset to negative balances in merchandise 
trade, and, consequently, the cumulative current account balance was a positive 
$3.8 billion for the period 1970-80. Since 1981, the progressively smaller balances 
in services have been insufficient to offset the increasingly negative merchandise 
trade balances [15]. Table 1-1 shows the deterioration in U. S. international 
accounts during this period. 
Table 1-1 
U. S. World Trade Balance and 
Current Account Balances 
1981-1985 
[Billions of U. S. Dollars) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
u. s. -39.6 -42.6 -69.4 -123.3 -143.8 -150 
Source: Economic Report of the President: 1986 
This apparent shift from U. S.-produced goods to foreign-produced goods 
has inflicted economic hardships on workers and producers in key sectors of 
the U. S. economy. For example, largely because of the 60 percent appreciation 
of the U. S. dollar on a trade-weighted basis, U. S. imports of capital goods rose 
from $29.6 billion in 1980 to an annual rate of almost $6S billion in the first 
half of 1985. Additionally, problems in the U. S. agricultural sector worsened 
as exports of agricultural products declined from $43.3 billion in 1981 to $30.1 
billion in 198S. 
The loss of competitiveness of U. S. producers inferred by their severely 
squeezed profits and the displacement of many industrial workers and farmers 
has produced a sharp rise in _protectionist sentiment in the United States. The 
result has been a deluge of legislation introduced in Congress over the past 
year seeking surcharges, quotas, or other protectionist measures on a wide 
array of foreign imports. The thesis of this study is that the effects of pro-
tectionism, particularly a surcharge, are so wide-ranging, complex and potentially 
detrimental that they must be clearly stated before their impacts can be estimated 
individually or in the aggregate . Thus, after a brief review of recent protectionist 
legislation introduced in Congress, a theoretical analysis of contemporary effects 
of a surcharge on U. S. imports is presented. 
Review of Surcharge Legislation in the United States Congress 
The amount of legislation introduced in Congress in the last 18 months 
can be construed as indicative of a tilt in United States trade policy toward 
protectionism . The recent trend began in February 1985 when the House of 
Representatives introduced H.R. 1139. The bill called for an immediate 20 percent 
surcharge on all U. S. imports. To force trade partners to open their markets 
to U. S. goods, provisions were included whereby surcharges could be removed 
as bilateral free-trade areas were negotiated . Three additional surcharge bills 
were introduced in the House during the spring of 1985. H.R. 1944 was the 
first and proposed to levy a 10 percent surcharge on Japanese imports to 
encourage Japan to eliminate a variety of non-tariff barriers on U. S. exports. 
The sentiment to expand protectionist measures to other trading partners surf aced 
in H.R. 2015. This time, proponents argued that surcharges on imports from 
Japan and other NA TO allies should be imposed in amounts sufficient to pay 
for U. S. troops stationed in respective NATO countries. Recognizing surcharge 
revenues could go toward the ever-widening gap between federal government 
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expenditures and revenues, the House introduced H.R. 2120 in April 1985. Sur-
charges would be imposed on all imports for a two year period and would decline 
from 20 percent to 10 percent over the period if federal budget deficits were 
reduced from projected levels. H.R. 3035 introduced in July established criteria 
to impose a 25 percent surcharge on imports from countries with a large trade 
surplus with the United States. At the time ' the bill was introduced, only Japan, 
Taiwan, Korea and Brazil met the criteria established in the legislation. 
The U. S. Senate has also been considering legislation which would impose 
import surcharges. The Senate introduced S. 761 in March 1985. The bill called 
for variable surcharge rates on imports from countries with large current account 
trade surpluses with the United States. Once again, Japan would have been 
the only country affected under the provisions of the bill in 1985. Senate bill 
S. 770 targeted imports exclusively from Japan and proposed a 20 percent surcharge 
on all Japanese imports. S. 906 introduced in April proposed the highest surcharge 
to date - a maximum 43 percent surcharge on imports from any country that 
had a substantial surplus in merchandise· trade with the United States and that 
engaged in unfair trade practices. 
Although Congress has not passed a bill which would specifically impose a 
surcharge on imports, both the Senate and House have passed resolutions by 
overwhelming majorities which could result in import surcharges. Both Senate 
Concurrent Resolution 15 and House Concurrent Resolution 107 call for the 
President to take retaliatory measures against Japan unless it opens its markets 
to U. S. goods. It should also be noted that in May the House of Representatives 
passed the Trade and International Reform Act of 1986 (commonly known as 
the omnibus trade bill). Specifically, the bill would tighten countervailing duty 
and antidumping rules, require countries who run large trade surpluses with the 
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United States to reduce those surpluses or face retaliation, and impose trade 
restrictions against countries who do not meet "internationally recognized workers' 
rights." When the new Congress convenes next year, factors such as another 
record U. S. trade deficit and persistent unemployment may increase the likelihood 
that Congress will pass sonic type of surcharge on imports. 
A Theoretical Analysis of Import Surcharges 
A growing number of rationales are being offered to justify trade restrictions 
and surcharges. Proponents of a surcharge argue it will reduce United States 
deficits in both foreign trade and the federal government budget, aid U. S. 
industries adversely affected by competition from imports, and induce trading 
partners to open their domestic markets to U. S. exports. Protectionist measures 
are advocated as a means to achieving two broad objectives. First, they are 
intended to provide visible and immediate relief to industries experiencing severe 
difficulties and especially to their workforce. And, secondly, they are intended 
to allow ongoing adjustments to changed economic or technological circumstances. 
Such admirable objectives correspond to a concern for (and political pressure 
for) employment and social equity on the one hand and to the goal of promoting 
greater economic efficiency and industrial restructuring on the other. Compared 
to the complexity of the objectives, protection is a fairly simple and blunt 
policy instrument. 
Trade protection has complex and pervasive effects throughout the economy. 
The lack of transparency of the many different types of measures being considered 
makes it difficult to quantitatively assess their impact on macroeconomic per-
formance indicators and any such assessment should be treated cautiously [3]. 
Nevertheless, recent empirical studies have estimated the aggregate effects on 
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the U. S. trade balance of a 20 percent surcharge on all imports. In 1985, the 
Congressional Research Service estimated that the improvement of the trade 
balance would be $19.6 billion if a 20 percent surcharge were implemented [8]. 
Wharton Econometrics and Data Resources, Inc. also presented the results of 
large-scale studies in 198~ [22] [11]. In testimony before the Senate Finance 
Committee in April of last year, Professor Lawrence Klein presented the results 
of the Wharton study and Robert Gavin, CEO of Motorola, presented the results 
of the DRI investigation. The Wharton study estimated an improvement in the 
U. S. trade balance in the range of $11.7 billion to $21.4 billion, while Data 
Resources, Inc. estimated a $54.3 billion improvement. 
The effects estimated in these studies are based primarily on economic 
theory which holds that the price mechanism is the main channel through which 
countries' international accounts are adjusted. However, in "real world" market 
economies, the actual adjustment process involves a myriad of individual, freely 
arrived at decisions by millions of consumers, producers and distributors in 
countries around the world, responding to gradually evolving market incentives. 
The analysis which follows identifies a broader set of factors which, at least 
in part, determine the demand for exports and imports, and should be considered 
in estimating the cumulative costs and benefits of protectionist measures. 
Surcharge Pass-Throughs 
The nominal purpose of a surcharge would be to reduce imports by increasing 
their prices to residents and, thereby, encouraging consumers to switch their 
purchases from imported goods to relatively less expensive domestically produced 
substitutes. Empirical estimates of the aggregate effect of a surcharge (usually 
20 percent) on the U. S. trade balance generally assume the "tax" is completely 
passed through by the sellers of imported goods to the final consumers. In 
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fact, the effectiveness of a surcharge in reducing exports depends to a large 
degree on the proportionality between the tax and the price increase, i.e., the 
extent to which the charge is actually passed on to ultimate buyers. Recent 
evidence suggests that foreign suppliers have the ability to absorb a surcharge 
and maintain their market shares. 
The U. S. dollar appreciated nearly 60 percent against OECD currencies 
between 1980 and 1985. Obviously, foreign sellers in U. S. markets faced a 
pricing policy dilemma. They could maintain prices of their goods (and thus 
their prof its) fixed in terms of their domestic currency and permit prices of 
their products to decline in terms of dollars in the U. S. market in an amount 
directly proportional to the appreciation of the dollar relative to their domestic 
currency. This strategy would have led to substantially lower U. S. prices for 
final consumers of imported goods. Alternatively, foreign sellers could maintain 
U. S. dollar prices in U. S. markets and increase their profits in their own 
currency in proportion to the depreciation of their currencies relative to the 
dollar. The pricing strategy chosen by most major industrial countries tended 
toward the latter option. A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
indicated that the 59 percent appreciation in the U. S. dollar between 1980 and 
1985 led to a mere 2 percent reduction in prices of U. S. imports [18]. This 
suggests that the remainder, some 57 percent, accrued to foreign producers as 
higher profits. Certainly, the sharp increase in profits accumulated by foreign 
sellers during the dollar's recent appreciation affords them the ability to moderate 
- if not absorb - increases in the prices of their products which might result 
from a surcharge. Such "excess" profits may partially explain why the dollar 
depreciation in recent months has not led to a rapid adjustment in the U. S. trade 
balance. 
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Exchange Rates 
A surcharge would initially give manufacturers in the U. S. a relative 
price advantage over imports. However, the initial advantage would tend to be 
negated by a round of secondary adjustments. Policymakers should anticipate 
the exchange rate response described by the economic theory of tariffs. Such 
adjustments would arise directly from the free market forces unleashed by a 
surcharge [13). 
If U. S. consumers shift their expenditures away from foreign produced 
goods and toward competing domestic products, the supply of dollars flowing to 
the foreign exchange markets would be reduced. To the extent that the exchange 
rate of the dollar relative to other currencies is determined continuously by 
the supply-demand relationship in the foreign exchange market, a reduction in 
supply would cause the dollar to appreciate. It follows that the larger the 
reduction in imports attributable to a surcharge, the smaller the supply of dollars 
will be to foreign exchange markets - and the greater the appreciation of the 
dollar. In addition to reducing the initial price advantage of U. S. import-
competing producers, the dollar appreciation would adversely affect the price 
competitiveness of U. S. exporters. As exports are discouraged, hard pressed 
U. S. export oriented industries, e.g., agriculture, would receive no direct benefits 
from the surcharge while most likely incurring further reductions in export-
related revenues and foreign markets. In the final analysis, the response of 
exchange rates to a surcharge would tend to remove entirely the positive trade-
balance effect of a surcharge [21). 
The complexity of current U. S. trade problems belies the simplistic logic 
of the foregoing analysis. The dramatic increase in the annual trade deficit 
from $25 billion to $144 billion between 1980 and 1985 is related to the sharp 
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rise in the value of the dolla~ over that period. However, the decline in the 
U. S. dollar since March 1985, which was accelerated by the U. S. government 
and four foreign governments, has not resulted in the reduction in the U. S. 
trade deficit suggested by conventional wisdom. In fact, the U. S. trade deficit 
has continued to increase -and by mid-year 1986 rose to an annual rate of $150 
billion [ 1 OJ. 
The rising U. S. trade deficit recorded in recent months has, assuredly, 
been influenced by a phenomenon known as the "J curve" effect. Although the 
"J curve" literature is primarily concerned with the trade balance impact of 
currency devaluations, the theory has relevant implications for a surcharge 
trade policy. It should also be noted that the predicted effect has political 
ramifications as the mettle of politically accountable policymakers may be seriously 
tested if protectionist measures do not produce immediate, visible benefits for 
constituents [4]. 
The evidence on devaluation and trade balances suggests that a worsening 
of the trade balance is usually observed over the period of time immediately 
following a devaluation. However, over a longer period of time a swing toward 
a positive improvement in the trade balance is expected. A surcharge would 
not have the exact impact of a devaluation on the trade balance because a 
surcharge would not automatically increase the flow of dollars to foreign producers 
as a result of higher import prices. However, the time necessary to improve 
the trade balance with a surcharge would be analogous to the adjustment period 
hypothesized by the "J curve.• Consumers and producers generally would adjust 
slowly to either a devaluation or a surcharge. It is only after an imported 
commodity is placed on the shelves that consumers can reject it due to its 
higher price. Since it takes purchasers time to recognize a changed competitive 
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condition and make adjustments, a consumer-response lag is inevitable. Also, 
there is a production-response lag as pre-existing contracts might not permit 
adjustments in new shipments. Until orders can be canceled or reduced, shipments 
may continue to arrive, thus raising the value of imports and frustrating policy-
makers. Further, additional time is required to phase out production and reduce 
manufacturing capacity. 
That the adjustment of exports and imports to relative price changes occurs 
only slowly over time has been found in many studies. A study by Junz and 
Rhomberg found in a sample of 13 industrial countries that the trade response 
to relative price changes took up to five years, with only 50 percent of the 
full effect occurring in the first three years [16). In societies that pursue instant 
gratification, lengthy adjustment periods would be perceived as policy failures 
which would necessitate further legislative efforts and could further exacerbate 
trade problems. 
Surcharges, Employment Protection and Modernization 
The worldwide slowdown in economic growth and consequent persistent 
high level of unemployment has increased the pressure on governments to attenuate 
the speed of structural adjustment and the rate of job losses. It appears that 
surcharges would have only a limited positive impact on U. S. employment in 
the protected sectors. To begin with, in the sectors most directly in competition 
with foreign suppliers, trade flows are usually a fairly minor determinant of 
employment levels. Also, unless surcharges are applied to all imports, trade 
diversion may result in a very limited impact on import volumes. 
Table 10-1 conveys a noted misconception, namely manufacturing employment 
declined over the decade 1974-1984 as a result of an increase in import penetration 
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Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
in the manufacturing sector. Further analysis suggests this outcome is not the 
result of a trade deficit and that a surcharge would be unlikely to provide 
much additional employment in the sector. Column S, denoting changes in labor 
productivity, provides a compelling answer to the question of why employment 
has declined in manufacturing between 1974-1984 - productivity has increased 
27.9 percent over the period. 
Import 
Penetration 
(percent)l 
7.2 
6.5 
6.7 
6.9 
7.8 
7.9 
8.2 
8.5 
8.9 
9.3 
10.9 
Table 10-1 
Manufacturing Sector Indicators 
1974-84 
Industrial 
Production Employment Productivity 
(1977-=100) ( thousands )2 (1977-100)3 
92.6 20,077 90.6 
83.4 18,323 92.9 
91.9 18,997 97.1 
100.0 19,682 100.0 
107.1 20,505 101.5 
111.5 21,040 101.4 
108.2 20,285 101.4 
110.5 20,170 103.6 
102.2 18,781 105.9 
110.2 18,434 112.9 
123.9 19,412 118.5 
Average 
Hourly Real Net Capital 
Earnings Stock (billions 
(dollars)4 1982 dollars)5 
4.42 581.1 
4.83 597.2 
5.22 612.5 
5.68 630.5 
6.17 655.1 
6.70 681.4 
7.27 707.2 
7.99 729.7 
8.49 741.3 
8.83 741.1 
9.18 752.9 
I Imports as percent of manufacturers' shipments plus imports minus exports; based on 
value data. 
2All employees; establishment data. 
3Output per hour of all persons. 
4For production workers. 
5End of year. Based on data to be published in Survey of Current Business. 
Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the Census), 
Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics), and Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
Manufatturing employment may well continue to decline as productivity 
grows and average hourly earnings rise. (Average hourly earnings for production 
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workers increased nearly 108 percent over the period). This decline in sectoral 
employment should not be construed as an inability of U. S. producers to compete 
internationally and a mandate for surcharges or other restrictive measures. 
Rather it is indicative of a process whereby U. S. producers can become more 
efficient, economically pr~fitable, and gain a competitive advantage over foreign 
producers. 
If import surcharges increase domestic producers' share of the home market, 
resources available for industrial adjustment will increase. The improved cash 
flow provides the opportunity for domestic firms to modernize plants and equip-
ment, to underwrite the costs of involvement in adjusting capacity to demand, 
and/or to diversify into more promising areas of activity. The increased profita-
bility resulting from protection may even encourage foreign producers to engage 
in joint ventures with domestic firms. However, protection normally reduces 
competitive pressures and, given the substantial costs adjustment entails, per-
petuates technical and economic inefficiency. Furthermore, the most execrable 
effect may be that the economic rents. created by protectionist measures in 
industries with low entry barriers simply attract new labor and capital resources 
as well as additional entrepreneurial talent. 
The widely sought after protection of a surcharge stands to delay, not 
hasten, the much needed structural adjustment in several industries. The non-
rubber footwear industry is an excellent case in point. The industry received 
temporary protection under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 for the purpose 
of promoting adjustment to a loss of competitiveness internationally. Orderly 
marketing agreements were negotiated with Taiwan and Korea to limit their 
shipments to allow for a revitalization of the U. S. industry [10). Despite the 
reduction in imports, no increase in real investment to retool the industry occurred 
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Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
and labor productivity declined. Not surprisingly the import relief did not 
allow most segments of the industry to become competitive with foreign producers, 
particularly the leading developing country exporters, who have cost differentials 
on the order of 5 or 6 to I. 
As Table 12-1 indicates, employment generally decreased in the last decade 
but not monotonically. 
Table 12-1 
Manufacturing Sector Indicators: Textiles and Apparel 
1974-84 
Import Penetration Real Output Productivity Real Net 
{12er£entll (billions Employment (1277 -= 1QQ}4 Capital Stock 
of 1982 (thousands)3 (billions of 
Textiles Apparel dollars)2 Textiles Apparel 1982 dollars )5 
4.3 7.6 28.2 2,328 80.7 88.5 26.8 
3.6 8.3 27.3 2,111 89.6 94.5 26.6 
3.8 10.3 31.0 2,237 91.8 94.5 26.5 
3.7 10.0 34.4 2,227 100.0 100.0 26.7 
4.3 12.1 35.1 2,231 102.3 104.2 26.9 
4.1 12.4 35.7 2,189 104.8 98.1 26.8 
4.3 12.9 36.2 ~.111 104.7 97.3 26.7 
4.9 13.8 36.l 2,067 106.6 103.6 26.3 
4.6 13.9 33.7 1,911 113.7 111.0 25.6 
4.7 15.4 37.3 1,905 24.6 
6.1 20.2 38.5 1,943 24.3 
llmports as percent of manufacturers' shipments plus imports minus exports; based on value 
data; 1984 estimated. 
2Real gross domestic product. 
3All employees; establishment data. 
4Output per hour of all employees; based on unpublished data from Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
5End of year. Based on data to be published in Survey of Current Business. 
The advanced technology which is being introduced is being implemented in the 
ancillary operations, such as cutting and grading. However, the stitching opera-
tions which account for 80 percent of value added are most likely to remain-
at least in the medium term - highly labor intensive. Thus, in fragmented, 
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labor-intensive industries, like clothing and footwear, there is a limited scope 
for profit-enhancing substitution of capital for labor, and protection appears 
unlikely to be able to reduce cost differentials between the industrialized nations 
and the major developing nation exporters ( l 7). 
Proponents of surcharges and other protectionist measures suggest that 
the scope for improving or regaining competitive advantage is greatest in oligo-
polistic industries [21). The logic is that since competition in such industries 
depends on economics of scale, technology and product differentiation, protection 
will encourage firms to use resources for adjustment and restructuring programs. 
The United States automobile industry and various segments of the EEC steel 
industry arc offered as prominent examples of such a process. Once again, 
however, it must be noted that a variety of factors may impede adjustment. 
Specifically, import surcharges distort market price and quantity signals, and 
make it difficult for domestic producers to accurately determine long-term costs 
and establish capital investment plans. Even if protection was successful over 
the long-term in creating persistent rents, domestic producers arc likely to 
benefit less than expected as profits encourage new entrants, including foreign 
companies, to seek a share of the protected market. In summary, protectionism 
is unlikely to provide the type of permanent restoration of competitive advantage 
envisioned by advocates in either large or small scale industries. 
Selective Surcharges and Trade Diversion 
Both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate considered legislation 
in 1985 which would impose a 20 percent surcharge on imports from Japan . 
Such a measure could be expected to generate pervasive trade diversion as 
imports from Japan are replaced by imports from other suppliers. Consequently, 
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while the U. S. bilateral trade balance with Japan would improve, the overall 
improvement in the U. S. trade balance would probably be modest. 
Table 14-1 shows the increase in imports by OECD countries and the United 
States from five major east Asian developing countries from 1979-1984. Both 
the total value imported· by the U. S. and percentage change in real terms 
increased significantly over the period. 
Table 14-1 
Total OECD Imports From 
Five Major East-Asian NICs 1979-84 
$ US billion -
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Singapore 5.1 7.0 6.6 6.6 6.9 8.6 
Korea 10.8 11.1 12.5 12.7 14.6 18.1 
Taiwan 11.9 13.8 15.2 15.6 18.4 23.7 
Hong Kong 10.2 12.3 12.6 12.2 13.3 15.5 
Malaysia 8.3 9.2 7.7 7.2 7.7 10.1 
Total 46.2 53.4 . 54.6 54.2 60.8 76.0 
of which 
imported by 
u. s. 17.6 20.4 23.0 24.1 29.7 39.8 
Percentage 
Annual rate of 
change in 
real terms 2 i 
Total 6.3 2.2 11.6 17.5 29.4 
u. s. 6.4 14.0 14.3 28.8 '42.1 
1. For 1984, based · on data for the first three quarters. 
2. Volume of imports: values deflated by the export price index of 
manufactures. 
Source: OECD Foreign Trade Statistics 
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It should be pointed out that trade diversion occurs most often in industries 
where a multiplicity of potential sources exist and in industries such as clothing 
and footwear where trade is highly responsive to price and quantity signals. 
However, in recent years as multinational enterprises have taken advantage of 
opportunities to shift pro~uction sites, trade diversion has resulted in previously 
less mobile industries, such as steel and consumer electronics. The 1977 Orderly 
Market Agreement (OMA) for color television receivers between Japan and the 
U. S. is an example of this phenomenon. At the time of the agreement, the 
OECD reports the U. S. imported 90 percent of completed TV receivers from 
Japan. Two years after the OMA, Japan's share of the U.S. market had declined 
to 50 percent. However, during this period the East-Asian countries, shown in 
the table above, increased their share of the market from 15 to 50 percent. 
Currently it is anticipated that the Voluntary Export Agreement for automobiles 
with Japan is affecting a similar result. Imports by the U. S. from Korea and 
Yugoslavia are increasing as Japan's import penetration remains relatively constant 
resulting in a negative impact on the trade deficit (6). 
Reaction Abroad 
No analysis of the impact of an import surcharge would be complete without 
taking into consideration the reaction in the rest of the world. As the largest 
trading nation, the United States exerts a strong influence on economic develop-
ments in virtually every nation in the world. These nations' exports to the 
United States represent, in many instances, a significant portion of their total 
economic activity. For that reason, a real or a perceived threat to their capacity 
to continue to export would no doubt draw a quick reaction. Viewed from 
abroad, such measures represent restrictions on foreign countries' exports. 
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Since the measures are expected to reduce employment and profits in foreign 
industries, the governments of our trading partners will be pressured to impose 
restrictions on imports from the U. S. A sample of what such a reaction might 
be was provided by the governing supranational body of the European Economic 
Community, the European Parliament, which passed a resolution in March 1985 
calling for immediate retaliatory action against U. S. exports in an equivalent 
amount if the U. S. government were to institute a surcharge on the exports 
[5]. 
Even modest increases in protectionist measures elicit foreign responses. 
In 1984 when the U. S. tightened its rules for determining the country of origin 
of imports, the Chinese reduced their purchase of U. S. agricultural exports in 
retaliation. Other nations would, no doubt, respond similarly; their collective 
action would deal a further blow to already hard-pressed U. S. exporters of 
both industrial and agricultural products. Given the questionable capacity of 
the surcharge to significantly reduce U. S. imports, the likely export-reducing 
retaliation abroad could result in an actual worsening of the U. S. trade balance 
from what it would have been without a surcharge. 
For others, particularly the developing nations whose "retaliatory leverage" 
against the United States might be rather small because they import little from 
us but who nevertheless rely heavily on exports to the United States for badly 
needed earnings of foreign exchange, the surcharge could pose grave difficulties. 
This could be particularly true of the group of developing nations in Latin 
America and elsewhere that in recent years have had difficulty in meeting their 
international debt obligations to the U. S. and other industrial nations' banks. 
A further impairment of their capacity to earn the dollars needed to service 
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their debt could, in some instances, lead to their default--with possibly disastrous 
consequences for some of the industrial world's banks. 
Conclusion 
The indirect nature, of the link between the instrument of a surcharge 
and the policy target of improving the U. S. trade deficit, along with employment 
and profits, has been emphasized in this paper. A theoretical economic analysis 
of contemporary scenarios pointed out the probable ineffectiveness of surcharges 
on U. S. imports. After examining the failure of the pass-through, the offsetting 
effects of exchange rates, the impact of trade diversion, and the possibility of 
retaliation, it is reasonable to expect a much smaller potential impact on the 
U. S. trade deficit than is hoped for by advocates of surcharges. Future estimates 
of the impact of protectionist measures on the U. S. trade balance and other 
macroeconomic variables should consider such important factors in their 
measurements. 
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